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ABSTRACT
We study the information in order flows in the world’s largest over-the-counter mar-
ket, the foreign exchange market. The analysis draws on a data set covering a broad
cross-section of currencies and different customer segments of foreign exchange end-
users. The results suggest that order flows are highly informative about future ex-
change rates and provide significant economic value. We also find that different
customer groups can share risk with each other effectively through the intermedia-
tion of a large dealer, and differ markedly in their predictive ability, trading styles,
and risk exposure.
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The foreign exchange (FX) market is the largest financial market in the world, with a daily
trading volume of about five trillion U.S. dollars (Bank for International Settlements (BIS,
2013)). Also, the FX market is largely organized as an over-the-counter (OTC) market,
meaning that there is no centralized exchange and that market participants can have only
partial knowledge about the trades of other market participants and available liquidity
in different market segments. Hence, despite its size and sophistication, the FX market
is fairly opaque and decentralized because of its market structure when compared to, for
example, the major equity markets. Adding to this lack of transparency, various trading
platforms have been introduced and market concentration has risen dramatically over the
last decade, with a handful of large dealers now controlling the lion’s share of FX market
turnover (see, for example, King, Osler, and Rime (2012)). In centralized, exchange-based
markets, there is a single price at any point in time – the market price. In decentralized
markets, by default, there is no visible common price. The FX market is the largest market
of this kind.
This paper addresses several related questions that arise in this market setting. First,
does customer order flow contain predictive information for future exchange rates? Answer-
ing this question is relevant for studies on market microstructure and market design, and
is useful for understanding the implications of the observed shift in market concentration.
Second, how does risk sharing take place in the FX market? Do customers systematically
trade in opposite directions or is their trading positively correlated and unloaded onto
dealers (as in, for example, Lyons (1997))? Answering these questions is also relevant for
market design and provides a better understanding of the functioning of OTC markets.
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Third, what characterizes different customer groups’ FX trading? For example, do they
speculate on trends or are they contrarian investors? And what way are they exposed to
or do they hedge against market risk? Answering these questions can improve our under-
standing of what ultimately drives different end-users’ demand for currencies and about
the ecology of the world’s largest financial market.
We tackle these questions empirically using a data set covering more than 10 years of
daily end-user order flow for up to 15 currencies from one of the top FX dealers. The
data are disaggregated into two groups of financial FX end-users (long-term demand-side
investment managers and short-term demand-side investment managers) and two groups
of nonfinancial FX end-users (commercial corporations and individual investors). We thus
cover the trading behavior of various segments of end-users that are quite heterogeneous
in their motives for market participation, informedness, and sophistication. We find that
(i) order flow by end-users is highly informative about future exchange rate changes, (ii)
different end-user segments actively engage in risk sharing with each other through the
intermediation of a large dealer, and (iii) end-user groups show heterogeneous behavior in
terms of trading styles and strategies as well as their exposures to risk and hedge factors.
This heterogeneity across players is crucial for risk sharing and helps explaining the vast
differences in the predictive content of flows across end-user segments that we document
in this paper.
To gauge the impact of order flow on currency excess returns, we rely on a simple port-
folio approach. This multi-currency framework allows for straightforward measurement
of the economic value of the predictive content of order flow and is a pure out-of-sample
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approach in that it only conditions on past information. Specifically, we sort currencies
into portfolios to obtain a cross-section of currency excess returns, which mimics the re-
turns to customer trading behavior and incorporates the information contained in (lagged)
flows.1 The information contained in customer trades is highly valuable from an economic
perspective. We find that currencies with the highest lagged total order flows (that is,
the strongest net buying pressure across all customer groups against the U.S. dollar) out-
perform currencies with the lowest lagged flows (that is, the strongest net selling pressure
across all customer groups against the U.S. dollar) by about 10% per annum (p.a.).
For portfolios based on disaggregated customer order flow, this spread in excess returns
is even more striking. A zero-cost long-short portfolio that mimics long-term demand-
side investment managers’ trading behavior yields an average excess return of 15% p.a.,
while conditioning on short-term demand-side investment managers’ flows leads to a spread
of about 10% p.a. Flows by commercial corporations basically generate no spread in
returns, whereas individual investors’ flows lead to a highly negative spread (about -14%
p.a.). In sum, we find that order flow is highly informative about future exchange rates.
This information is further enhanced by the non-anonymous nature of transactions in
OTC markets, as trades by different categories of customers convey fundamentally different
information for price movements.
What drives the predictive content in flows? We investigate three main channels. First,
order flow could be related to the processing of information by market participants via the
process of “price discovery.” According to this view, order flow acts as the key vehicle that
impounds views about (economic) fundamentals into exchange rates.2 If order flow contains
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private information, its effect on exchange rates is likely to be persistent. Second, there
could be a price pressure (liquidity) effect due to downward-sloping demand curves (e.g.,
Froot and Ramadorai (2005)). If such a mechanism is at play, we are likely to observe a
positive correlation between flows and prices for some limited time, followed by a subsequent
reversal as prices revert to fundamental values.3 Third, we consider the possibility that
order flow is linked to returns due to the different risk-sharing motives and risk exposures of
market participants. For example, order flow could reflect portfolio rebalancing of investors
tilting their portfolios towards currencies that command a higher risk premium. Related to
this, risk-sharing could lead to the observed predictability pattern if nonfinancial customers
are primarily concerned about laying off currency risk and implicitly paying an insurance
premium, while financial investors are willing to take on that risk.
Discriminating between alternative explanations for the predictive content of order flow,
we find clear differences across the four segments of end-users. Long-term demand-side in-
vestment managers’ flows are associated with permanent shifts in future exchange rates,
suggesting that their order flow is related to superior processing of fundamental informa-
tion.4 In contrast, short-term demand-side investment managers’ flows are associated with
transitory exchange rate movements. This result is more in line with short-term liquidity
effects than fundamental information processing. The flows of commercial corporations
and individual investors seem to reflect largely uninformed trading.
Our results also point to substantial heterogeneity across customers in their trading
styles and risk exposures, giving rise to different motives for risk sharing. First, we find
that the trades of various end-user groups react quite differently to past returns. Long-
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term demand-side investment managers tend to be “trend followers” (positive feedback
traders) with regard to past currency returns. By contrast, individual investors tend to
be “contrarians” (negative feedback traders). The latter finding squares well with recent
findings for equity markets by Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008), who show that individ-
ual equity investors behave as contrarians, implicitly providing liquidity for institutional
investors. Different from their results, however, individual investors do not directly benefit
from serving as (implicit) counterparties of financial customers in FX markets. Second,
the flows of most customer groups are negatively correlated over short to intermediate
horizons, suggesting that different groups of end-users in FX markets engage in active risk
sharing among each other. Thus, it is not just via the interdealer market that risk is shared
in FX markets, as documented by Lyons (1997): a large dealer can provide the venue for
customers to share risk due to the large size of its dealing platform, reducing the need for
dealers to unload large inventories in the interdealer market. Third, we find substantial
heterogeneity in the exposure to risk and hedge factors across customer segments. Long-
term demand-side investment managers’ trading does not leave them exposed adversely to
systematic risk, which suggests that the information in their flows is not due to risk taking
but rather likely reflects superior information processing. Short-term demand-side invest-
ment managers, by contrast, are significantly exposed to systematic risk such as volatility,
liquidity, and credit risk. This lends credence to the view that short-term demand-side
investment managers earn positive returns in FX markets by effectively providing liquid-
ity and selling insurance to other market participants. For nonfinancial customers there is
some evidence of hedging but it is not strong enough to fully explain their negative forecast
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performance arising from poor short-term market timing.
Our paper is related to prior work on the microstructure approach to exchange rates
(e.g. Evans and Lyons (2002)), which suggests that order flow is crucial for understanding
how information is incorporated into exchange rates. It is well known from the literature
that order flow is positively associated with contemporaneous returns in basically all asset
classes; see, for example, Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b) for stock markets and Brandt and
Kavajecz (2004) for U.S. bonds. This stylized fact also holds in FX markets, as shown by
Evans and Lyons (2002) and many subsequent studies. It is less clear, however, whether
order flow contains predictive information for exchange rates. A few papers show that FX
order flow (both from interdealer and customer markets) contains information about future
currency returns, but they tend to disagree on the source of this predictive power (e.g.,
Evans and Lyons (2005), Froot and Ramadorai (2005), Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2010)).5 A
few other papers fail to find robust predictive power of exchange rates by order flow in the
first place, using commercially available order flow data (see, for example, Sager and Taylor
(2008)). Our work is also related to a strand of recent literature that analyzes the returns
to currency portfolios by investigating the predictive power of currency characteristics,
such as carry or lagged returns, and the role of risk premia in currency markets.6
Overall, we contribute to the literature in the following ways. We are the first to show
that order flow forecasts currency returns in an out-of-sample forecasting setting by di-
rectly examing currency portfolio returns based on lagged order flow. This is important
as earlier papers either do not consider out-of-sample forecasting or rely on purely sta-
tistical performance measures derived from time-series forecasts of a limited number of
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currency pairs (e.g., Evans and Lyons (2005), who study the DEM/USD and JPY/USD
crosses). Time-series forecasts are affected by trends in exchange rates, most notably the
U.S. dollar. Our portfolio procedure, by contrast, studies exchange rate predictability in
dollar-neutral long-short portfolios, and it does so in an out-of-sample setting over very long
time spans compared to existing FX microstructure literature. Moreover, we are the first
to test whether risk exposure drives the information in customer order flows. We show how
different key FX market players trade, for example, the extent to which they follow trends
or behave as contrarians, and the degree to which they are exposed to systematic risk. We
find strong evidence of heterogeneity in exposures and trading behavior across different
groups of market participants. These findings indicate that there is significant risk sharing
between financial and nonfinancial customers as well as between different groups of finan-
cial customers (long-term versus short-term demand-side investment managers) through
the intermediation of a large dealer.
Taken together, these results have implications for our understanding of information
flows in OTC markets. These results also add to our understanding of how risk is shared
in financial markets due to different motives for trade and trading styles across end-user
segments.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section I describes our data, Section
II presents empirical results on the predictive power of order flow, Section III empirically
investigates alternative reasons for why order flow forecasts FX excess returns, and Section
IV presents robustness tests. Section V concludes.
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I. Data
Aggregate order flow. We employ a data set based on daily customer order flows for up
to 15 currency pairs over the period January 2, 2001 to May 27, 2011, for a total of 2,664
trading days. Hence, in contrast to much of the earlier literature, we employ order flow
from the end-user segment of the FX market and not from the interdealer market. This
is important since microstructure models suggest that the information in flows stems from
trading with customers and not from interdealer trading (e.g., Evans and Lyons (2002)).
Order flows in our sample are measured as net buying pressure against the U.S. dollar
(USD), that is, the U.S. dollar volume of buyer-initiated minus seller-initiated trades of a
currency against the USD. A positive number indicates net buying pressure in the foreign
currency relative to the USD. Note that order flows do not measure trading volume but
rather net buying (or selling) pressure, as mentioned above. Aggregate order flows, that
is, aggregated across customers, are available for the following 15 currencies: Australia
(AUD), Brazil (BRL), Canada (CAD), the Euro (EUR), Hong Kong (HKD), Japan (JPY),
Sweden (SEK), Mexico (MXN), New Zealand (NZD), Norway (NOK), Singapore (SGD),
South Africa (ZAR), South Korea (KRW), Switzerland (CHF), and the United Kingdom
(GBP). In the following, we refer to these flows as “total flows” since they are aggregated
across all customers.
The order flows used in this paper have standard properties, similar to what has been
found in other studies in this line of literature (see, for example, Froot and Ramadorai
(2005)): Daily flows tend to be positively autocorrelated but the degree of autocorrelation
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is very small albeit sometimes statistically significant; major currencies, such as the EUR,
CHF, JPY, GBP, have much larger variation in order flows and hence a larger absolute
size of order flows compared to other currencies and especially emerging markets. This is
intuitive as there is much more trading in major currencies, but it also suggests that one
cannot easily compare order flows across currencies and that some form of standardization
is needed to make sensible comparisons.7 We take this into account in our empirical analysis
below. Finally, aggregate order flows display high kurtosis that is largely driven by some
days with extremely high (in absolute value) order flows. Eliminating these few outliers
does not change our results reported below.
Disaggregated order flow. We also have access to order flows disaggregated by customer
groups for the same sample period, albeit only for a subset of nine major currencies.8
There are four customer groups for which flows are available: long-term demand-side in-
vestment managers (LT), short-term demand-side investment managers (ST), commercial
corporations (CO), and individual investors (II).9 Long-term demand-side investment man-
agers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and pension funds, whereas
short-term demand-side investment managers comprise other funds and proprietary trading
firms. The commercial corporations’ segment includes nonfinancial corporations whereas
individual investors represent trading by individuals. Hence, there is substantial hetero-
geneity in the motives for market participation across the four customer types, and these
groups are likely to differ considerably in their degree of informedness and sophistication.
Note that our data set only contains order flows based on customer-initiated trades, which
means that this paper has nothing to say about the trading strategies of the dealer or any
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other FX dealing bank.
Exchange rate returns and excess returns. For our empirical analysis below, we comple-
ment the above order flow data with daily spot exchange and forward rates from Reuters
(available from Datastream). We denote log changes in spot exchange rates as “exchange
rate returns,”
∆st+1 = st+1 − st, (1)
where lowercase letters refer to logs and all exchange rates are quoted as the USD price of
foreign currency, so that positive exchange rate returns correspond to an appreciation of
the foreign currency. Hence, a positive correlation of order flows and exchange rate returns
means that net buying pressure in the foreign currency (against the USD) is associated
with an appreciation of the foreign currency (against the USD) and vice versa.
We also compute currency excess returns, which account for the interest rate differential
in a foreign currency position. Hence, currency excess returns rx are given by
rxt+1 = st+1 − st + (i?t − it), (2)
where i? denotes the foreign interest rate and it denotes the U.S. interest rate. Since we
are working at the daily frequency in our main analysis, we need to obtain daily interest
rates for all 15 countries (plus the U.S. interest rate). However, since one-day interest
rates are not directly available for all countries in our sample, we employ information in
forward rates to infer interest rate differentials. Interest rate differentials for horizon k are
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commonly approximated by i?k,t − ik,t ≈ st − fk,t, where fk,t denotes the log forward rate
for horizon k of a given currency.10
II. The Value of Information in Customer Flows
A. Portfolios Conditioning on Aggregate Order Flow
We rely on a portfolio approach, mimicking the returns to customer FX trading by
conditioning on lagged order flow. This provides a straightforward and intuitive assessment
of how powerful order flow is in predicting currency excess returns.
As a benchmark test, we first sort currencies into portfolios based on (lagged) total order
flows for each currency. Specifically, we sort currencies into five portfolios (P1, P2, ..., P5)
depending on their total order flow on day t and compute portfolio excess returns (or spot
exchange rate changes) for the following day. In this basic setup, portfolios are rebalanced
at the end of each trading day. Note that these portfolios are computed from the viewpoint
of a U.S. investor as each individual portfolio consists of a short position in USD and a
long position in a basket of foreign currencies. Taking the return difference between any
two portfolios Pj − Pi thus gives the return of a portfolio short in the basket of foreign
currencies in Pi and long in the basket of currencies in Pj, so that the USD component
cancels out and the long-short portfolio is dollar-neutral by construction.
Standardizing order flows. Before sorting currencies into portfolios, we need to make
sure that order flows are comparable across currencies. As the absolute size of order flows
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differs across currencies it is not sensible to sort currencies based on raw order flows. To
allow for meaningful cross-currency comparisons, it is necessary to standardize flows. We
do this by dividing flows by their standard deviation to remove the difference in absolute





where x˜Rj,t denotes order flow standardized over a rolling window and xj,t denotes the raw
order flow. In our baseline results, we compute the standard deviation of flows via a
rolling scheme over a 60-day window. Robustness tests based on alternative approaches to
standardize flows are reported in a separate Internet Appendix.11
Portfolio excess returns. Table I shows average annualized excess returns for order
flow portfolios (P1, P2, ..., P5), where P1 contains the three currencies with the lowest
lagged standardized order flow and P5 contains the three currencies with the highest lagged
standardized order flow. Hence, P5 can be thought of as a portfolio of currencies with the
highest buying pressure, whereas P1 refers to a portfolio with the strongest selling pressure.
Column “Av.” shows average returns across all currencies in the cross-section and column
“BMS” denotes a portfolio that is long in P5 and short in P1 (“Buying Minus Selling”
pressure). We report returns for the full sample period from January 2001 to May 2011.12
To get started, Panel A of Table I reports results for the sample of all 15 markets (T15)
as well as the subsample of nine developed markets (T9); for the T9 subsample we form
only four portfolios rather than five to ensure we always have two currencies in the corner
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portfolios. We observe a strong increase in average excess returns as we move from the
portfolio of currencies with low buying pressure, P1, to the one with high buying pressure,
P5 (or P4 for the T9 sample). The spread in excess returns between the high buying pressure
portfolio and the low buying pressure portfolio, that is, the excess return of the BMS
portfolio, is economically large (10.31% and 12.43% p.a., respectively) and statistically
highly significant. Similarly, the Sharpe Ratios (p.a.) of the two BMS portfolios of 1.26
and 1.45 are large and also point toward high economic significance. Thus, order flows carry
significant information for future currency excess returns, as captured by our dollar-neutral
out-of-sample trading strategy that only conditions on real-time information.
Table I about here
Table IA.II in the Internet Appendix shows results for the other standardization schemes
and by subsample. We find that our results are equally strong across various subperiods.
Table IA.III in the Internet Appendix repeats this exercise for exchange rate changes
instead of excess returns. The results in that table clearly show that the patterns in
average spot exchange rate changes across portfolios are at least as strong as those for
average excess returns. Hence, order flow is informative about future spot rates and not
about interest rate differentials. Figure IA.1 in the Internet Appendix plots the cumulative
excess returns to the BMS portfolios.
Tests for return monotonicity. The columns “MR” and “Up” in Table I report tests
for return monotonicity (Patton and Timmermann (2010)), that is, whether there is a
significantly increasing or decreasing pattern of average excess returns when moving from
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the portfolio of low buying pressure (P1) to the one with high buying pressure (P5).
13 These
tests go beyond the standard t-test of a zero BMS portfolio return since they take into
account the entire cross-sectional pattern. This is interesting since one would intuitively
expect an increasing pattern of average portfolio excess returns when moving from P1 to P5
if order flow is truly informative about future excess returns. This prediction is significantly
borne out in the data for both the“MR”and the“Up”tests. Hence, there is strong evidence
for a significant relationship between order flow and future excess returns.
B. Portfolios Conditioning on Disaggregated Order Flow
If superior information processing or genuine forecasting ability drive our results above,
one would expect clear differences in the forecasting power of different customers’ order
flows, depending on the groups’ characteristics (see, for example, Evans and Lyons (2007)).
Specifically, one would expect to see superior information processing in flows of financial
customers, given that nonfinancial players do not specialize in FX trading as their core
activity. To investigate this, we now build portfolios based on our disaggregated data for
customer flows. We closely follow the earlier approach with the exception that we build
only four portfolios (rather than five) here since we have disaggregated flows for only nine
currencies and want to have a minimum of two currencies per portfolio.
Table I, Panel B reports results for the four customer groups (long-term demand-side
investment managers (LT), short-term demand-side investment managers (ST), commercial
corporations (CO), and individual investors (II)). The results are clear-cut. Long-term
demand-side investment managers’ net buying or selling pressure for currencies is the most
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informative about subsequent exchange rate behavior. Conditioning on long-term demand-
side investment managers’ flows generates a cross-sectional spread in excess returns of 15%
p.a., followed by short-term demand-side investment managers with a spread of about
10%. In stark contrast, the flows of commercial corporations and individual investors
actually generate a negative spread in portfolio excess returns of about −4% and −14%,
respectively.14 The results point towards substantial differences in customers’ predictive
information. The latter is underscored by the large spread in (annualized) Sharpe Ratios
of BMS portfolios across customer groups. Long-term demand-side investment managers’
BMS portfolio yields a Sharpe Ratio of 1.79, whereas individual investors’ BMS portfolio
has a Sharpe Ratio of -1.55.15
As above, we also present p-values for tests of return monotonicity. Since the order
flow of corporations and individual customers negatively forecasts returns, in these cases
we modify the MR test to check for a monotonically decreasing pattern. Results from
these tests corroborate the simple t-tests for the BMS portfolios. There is a monotonically
increasing pattern in average excess returns for portfolios based on long-term demand-
side investment managers’ and short-term demand-side investment managers’ flows that
is highly significant. By contrast, we find a monotonically decreasing pattern in average
excess returns for portfolios based on individual investors’ flows, and marginally significant
evidence for a decreasing pattern in portfolios based on commercial corporations’ flows.
Taken together, the results show that not all order flow is equal in terms of its informa-
tion content for exchange rates. Instead, financial customers’ flows (long-term demand-side
investment managers and short-term demand-side investment managers) account for the
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positive relation between lagged flows and future exchange rate returns uncovered in the
previous section. Flows of commercial corporations are more or less uninformative, and
individual investors’ flows even forecast returns in the wrong direction. The latter finding
of poor trading performance and market-timing skills by individual investors is in line with
earlier evidence for stock markets that shows individuals tend to lose money from trading
(e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), Hvidkjaer (2008), Barber et al. (2009)). Using total
end-user order flow masks these differences and might even lead to incorrect inferences
about the link between flows and returns. In a nutshell, what matters for the relation be-
tween end-user order flows and future returns is disaggregated data, since the information
content of flows for future returns varies markedly across customer groups.
The middle and lower panels of Figure IA.1 plot cumulative returns for all four customer
groups. It can directly be seen that returns are very different across customer groups, even
when comparing, for example, long-term demand-side investment managers and short-
term demand-side investment managers. Both groups’ BMS portfolios generate significant
excess returns, but returns for short-term demand-side investment managers are much
more volatile than those of long-term demand-side investment managers. We investigate
possible sources of these different return behaviors below.
C. Marginal Predictive Content of Flows at Longer Horizons
Our analysis so far focuses on the relation between order flows and returns over the subse-
quent trading day. An interesting question that arises, however, is whether the information
contained in order flow quickly decays or is useful for forecasting returns over more than
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one trading day.
To examine the marginal predictive content of flows, we form portfolios as in the anal-
ysis above but we now allow for a longer lag between the order flow signal and portfolio
formation. Table II presents the results for lags of 0, 1, 2, . . . , 9 days. To be more specific,
a lag of zero days means that flows of trading day t are used to predict returns of day t+ 1
(thus reproducing the BMS returns from Table I above), whereas a lag of, say, two days
means that flows of day t are used to forecast returns of trading day t+ 3.
Table II about here
The results in Table II show that order flow appears to be most informative for the
first two to three days after portfolio formation, with the information in flows becoming
insignificant afterwards. Hence, the information contained in daily flows is fairly short-
lived and is impounded into exchange rates relatively quickly. This finding is in contrast
to, for example, Evans and Lyons (2005), who study a shorter and smaller sample and
find that times-series predictability of returns by order flow increases at longer horizons
when judged from statistical metrics of forecast evaluation. This contrast in results also
highlights the importance of not assessing the predictive power of order flow based only on
purely statistical measures, as statistical evidence of exchange rate predictability in and
of itself does not guarantee that an investor can earn profits from a trading strategy that
exploits this predictability.
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III. What Drives the Predictive Power of Flows?
A. Permanent vs. Transitory Forecast Power of Flows
To better understand the forces driving our results above, we next investigate whether
order flow forecasts returns because it signals permanent shifts in spot exchange rates or
whether it merely forecasts temporary movements that are eventually reversed after some
time. The question of whether order flow has a permanent or transitory effect on prices
is a central one in earlier microstructure literature (see Hasbrouck (1991a, 1991b)). A
transitory movement would be interpreted as suggesting that order flow effects are merely
due to short-term liquidity or price pressure effects that eventually die out, whereas a
permanent movement in spot rates would indicate that order flow conveys information
about fundamentals.16 More specifically, a permanent price impact would indicate that
order flow is related to changes in expectations about fundamentals given the daily frequency
we are working with. Since we find substantial heterogeneity with regard to the forecasting
power of different customer groups’ order flows, the question of whether all (or some)
customers’ flows signal information relevant for permanent changes in FX rates or whether
some customer groups’ flows simply exert price pressure and liquidity effects is of interest.
To this end, we employ our portfolio sorts framework as above but now track cumulative
exchange rate returns to BMS portfolios for overlapping periods of 30 trading days after
portfolio formation. This approach yields a direct estimate of how spot rates move after
experiencing intensive buying or selling pressure from customers.
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Figure 1 illustrates the persistence of the predictive content of order flow. The solid lines
show the cumulative excess returns (in basis points), whereas the shaded areas show 95%
confidence intervals based on a moving-block bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions. Total flows
for all 15 currencies (T15) forecast a permanent change in spot rates that is statistically
significantly different from zero. Exchange rates with the highest net buying (selling)
pressure appreciate (depreciate) against the USD for approximately three days. Currency
returns on the BMS portfolios increase by about 15 basis points over this period, and
afterwards the effect of the order flow signal levels out. Importantly, these findings suggest
that order flow conveys information and its impact on exchange rates is not reversed.
Figure 1 about here
This picture changes when looking only at the nine developed currencies. Here, we ob-
serve the same increasing pattern initially, followed by a subsequent partial reversal. After
approximately 25 to 30 trading days, about one-half of the initial impact of 15 basis points
is reversed and the confidence interval includes zero. Hence, there is much less evidence
that order flow conveys information about fundamentals when only looking at major de-
veloped markets. This finding makes sense, however, since the major currency markets are
most probably more researched and more efficient than smaller currency markets, so that
the scope for superior information processing is reduced.17
As a natural next step, we reexamine this question for disaggregated order flows (lower
panels of Figure 1). The results are clear-cut. The only end-user group with a statistically
significant permanent price impact is that of long-term demand-side investment managers.
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Short-term demand-side investment managers’ trading has a positive but transitory impact,
commercial corporations have no impact at all, and individual investors have a transitory
negative impact. Given our finding for the total flows of the nine major currencies above,
it is interesting to see that long-term demand-side investment managers’ flows are indeed
associated with permanent spot rate changes. This suggests that the order flow of long-
term demand-side investment managers is likely related to the processing of fundamental
information whereas that of short-term demand-side investment managers corresponds to
short-lived information that is less strongly related to fundamental information. Similarly,
it is reasonable that the negative relation between individual investors’ flows and future
spot rates dies out over time.
These findings suggest that the order flows of different end-user groups embed different
information for future exchange rates. These differences can arise either because they
are based on different mechanisms to process information or because of different trading
motives and hedging needs. To explore these possibilities further, and thus shed light on
the observed differences in end-user order flows, we investigate the drivers of order flow in
more detail below.
B. Risk-Sharing among Foreign Exchange End-Users
The analysis above suggests that long-term demand-side investment managers’ order flows
are related to the processing of fundamental information that is quickly and permanently
impounded into prices, whereas the other customer groups’ order flows are not. A potential
explanation is that risk sharing among market participants drives our results, at least in
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part. A risk-sharing story implies that we observe customers systematically trading in
opposite directions and that their portfolios load on different sources of systematic risk.
We investigate these issues below.
Portfolio returns in event time. We first provide a more detailed look at the return
behavior around portfolio formation dates to better understand differences in customer
groups. Figure 2 shows the average annualized BMS excess return for the five days prior to
portfolio formation (days −5,−4, ...,−1), the day of portfolio formation (day 0), and the
first ten days after portfolio formation (days 1, 2, ..., 10). Shaded areas correspond to 95%
confidence intervals based on Newey and West (1987) standard errors. Note that these
returns, unlike in Figure 1, are not cumulative.
Figure 2 about here
Two results stand out. First, long-term demand-side investment managers tend to
be trend followers in that they exert buying (selling) pressure in currencies that recently
appreciated (depreciated). Conversely, individual investors tend to trade against the trend,
that is, they react upon past returns in a contrarian fashion. The pattern for short-
term demand-side investment managers and commercial corporations is less clear. Second,
formation-day returns (day 0) are significantly different from zero for all four customer
groups. However, short-term demand-side investment managers (positive) and individual
investors (negative) have the largest contemporaneous returns in absolute value, indicating
that either their trades heavily drive exchange rates or their trades are heavily triggered
by returns (e.g., via stop-loss and stop-buy orders).
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Overall, these findings suggest that customer groups’ trading positions at least partly
offset each other, as long-term demand-side investment managers and individual investors
clearly differ in terms of their trend-following behavior. This finding is different from
equity markets, for which Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2008) find that individual investors
tend to be contrarian traders but experience subsequent positive returns, presumably due
to implicitly providing liquidity to institutional investors. In our data, we find similar
contrarian behavior of individual investors, but this trading behavior does not yield positive
returns on average.
Flow correlations over longer horizons. Given these findings, we next look at the cor-
relations among customer groups’ flows directly. While there is little contemporaneous
correlation in flows, as we note above (see Table IA.I in the Internet Appendix), it is nev-
ertheless interesting to look at flows over longer horizons to find out if customer groups
tend to trade in the same or opposite directions. For a risk-sharing explanation to make
sense, we would expect to see negative flow correlations between customer groups at some
horizons.
Figure 3 plots contemporaneous correlations between standardized flows of different cus-
tomer groups for horizons of one to 60 days (using overlapping observations), where the
shaded areas correspond to 95% bootstrap confidence intervals. The two financial cus-
tomer groups (long-term and short-term demand-side investment managers) tend to trade
in opposite directions over very short horizons but in the same direction over the longer
run. Moreover, all correlations between financial and nonfinancial customers are signifi-
cantly negative at all horizons, while there is no significant correlation between flows of
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the nonfinancial customer groups. These results are generally in line with a risk-sharing
story whereby financial players trade in the opposite direction of nonfinancial market par-
ticipants. This finding is interesting because the perception in the literature is that risk
sharing only takes place in the interdealer market (see, for example, Lyons (1997)) where
dealers quickly lay off their accumulated inventory from customer orders. Our results in-
dicate that risk sharing can also take place in the customer market due to the negative
correlation of the order flows of different market segments.
Figure 3 about here
Drivers of flows. As a natural next step we seek to provide a better understanding
of the drivers of end-user order flows and shed light on the source of the negative flow
correlations discussed above. First, we examine whether the flows of some customer groups
systematically lead the flows of other groups. Second, we study whether customers’ flows
differ in their response to lagged asset returns in other key asset classes. In this context we
are interested in the possible effects of portfolio rebalancing on the end-user demand for
currencies (Hau and Rey (2004)). To investigate this question, we run panel regressions
of order flows on lagged flows and further explanatory variables, such as interest rate
differentials (i?t − it), lagged exchange rate changes over one and 20 days (∆st,∆st−1;t−20),
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where c denotes one of the four customer groups, j denotes currencies/countries, and
εj,t+1 = et+1 + uj + j,t+1 includes both cross-sectional and time fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by currency pair. We use benchmark 10-year government bonds and
country equity indices from Datastream for bond and stock returns. The frequency is daily.
Results from these regressions are reported in Table III. For each customer group we
report one specification that only includes lagged flows and one that additionally includes
interest rate differentials and lagged returns.18 Looking first at the specifications that only
include lagged flows, we find that the flows of long-term demand-side investment managers
are significantly related to the flows of the other groups. These results (akin to simple
Granger causality tests) corroborate the notion that long-term demand-side investment
managers tend to trade very differently from, and indeed in the opposite direction of, non-
financial customers. Flows of short-term demand-side investment managers do not load
significantly on lagged flows of any group, again indicating that long-term demand-side
investment managers and short-term demand-side investment managers behave quite dif-
ferently. The flows of commercial corporations are positively driven by own lagged flows
and lagged flows of individual investors, whereas flows of individual investors are signifi-
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cantly negatively related to lagged short-term demand-side investment managers’ flows and
are significantly positively autocorrelated. In sum, there are numerous interrelationships
between customer flows and their lags, but it may be overambitious to interpret them in
any structural way.
Table III about here
When we include lagged returns as additional regressors, we find that long-term demand-
side investment managers trade against the interest rate differential, whereas commercial
corporations trade with the interest rate differential. Surprisingly, flows of short-term
demand-side investment managers (and individual investors) are not affected by the inter-
est differential, suggesting that on average carry trading does not drive their flows in our
sample. Results for lagged exchange rates indicate that long-term demand-side investment
managers are trend followers (positive feedback traders), whereas individual investors can
be described as contrarians (negative feedback traders). Long-term demand-side invest-
ment managers’ flows also react significantly positively to lagged equity returns, whereas
individual investors’ flows are positively driven by lagged bond returns. Hence, investors
tend to increase their position in a currency (against the USD) when the country’s stock
market return has been high (long-term demand-side investment managers) or when gov-
ernment bond prices have been increasing (individual investors). These results do not
suggest that order flows are driven by portfolio rebalancing in the sense that investors sell
a currency in response to rising equity or bond prices in the country (see, for example, the
mechanism described in Hau and Rey (2004)). However, the results strongly support the
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notion that flows of different groups are driven in part by the returns of other asset classes.
The results also show that the factors that drive flows clearly differ across end-user groups.
C. Differences in Risk Exposures
Finally, we investigate whether differences in risk exposures can account for BMS re-
turn patterns across FX end-users. A risk channel could explain the observed BMS excess
returns if long-term demand-side investment managers and short-term demand-side in-
vestment managers tilt their portfolios towards risky currencies and earn a risk premium
whereas commercial corporations and individual investors tilt their portfolios towards safe
currencies and earn low or even negative returns.
Since there are many possible sources of systematic risk in our case, we consider an
augmented version of the Fung and Hsieh (2001, 2002, 2004) multi-factor model as the
basis for these risk adjustments. The Fung-Hsieh model has served as the workhorse for
understanding risk exposures in the literature (see, for example, Patton and Ramadorai
(2013)). The model relies on various U.S. equity market and bond market factors and
also includes the returns on trend-following strategies to capture exposures to nonlinear
option-like payoffs that are quite typical of hedge funds. The trend-following factors are
constructed from portfolios of lookback straddles in various asset classes. We modify the
framework to make it amenable to an analysis focused on the FX market and to allow
for conditional exposures (e.g., Ferson and Schadt (1996), Patton and Ramadorai (2013)).
The regression that serves as the basis of these tests takes the form
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θjrm;t · zj;t−1 + t. (5)
The set of factors Ft includes the excess return on the U.S. equity market (rm), the
change in the yield spread of U.S. long-term bonds (∆TS), and changes in credit spreads
(∆DF ). It further includes returns on portfolios of lookback straddles for FX futures and
interest rate futures, denoted by PTFSFX and PTFSIR, respectively. We augment this
subset of factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004) with additional factors intended to capture
FX-related risk. We include the dollar risk factor (DOL) and the carry factor (HMLFX) of
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) as well as a factor-mimicking portfolio of global
FX volatility (V OLFX) from Menkhoff et al. (2012a). Following Patton and Ramadorai
(2013), we also allow for conditional risk exposures by interacting the equity market factor,
rm;t, with lagged conditioning variables, zj;t−1. In particular, we consider (a) changes in
the TED spread (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen, (2009)), (b) changes in the VIX
(Whaley (2000)), and (c) the change in the three-month T-bill rate.
To keep the analysis tractable and to avoid overfitting, we perform model selection of
the space of risk factors. Ideally, we want to explore the same set of factors for each of the
customer segments to be able to compare the exposures across customers and learn about
differences that can explain the variation in BMS excess returns. However, as financial
and nonfinancial customers are likely to be very different, we focus on long-term demand-
side investment managers versus short-term demand-side investment managers in the first
set of results and individual investors versus commercial corporations in the second set
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of results. More specifically, we perform model selection over a two-equation seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) for long-term demand-side investment managers’ and short-
term demand-side investment managers’ BMS returns, and a separate model selection for
a SUR for commercial corporations and individual investors.
The results are in Table IV. Panel A shows results for linear models, whereas Panel B
allows for conditional market exposures. We report the four best-performing models with
a maximum of three factors included in the regression. The best linear model in Panel A
picks global FX volatility (V OLFX) as the single factor. Other model specifications that
also perform well tend to incorporate the trend-following factors as well as term spread and
default spread changes. Interestingly, when comparing long-term demand-side investment
managers’ and short-term demand-side investment managers’ exposures to these factors, we
find that the signs are always opposite. While long-term demand-side investment managers’
BMS returns load positively on FX volatility shocks, trend-following factors, and changes
in the default spread, short-term demand-side investment managers load negatively on
these factors. This means that long-term demand-side investment managers’ FX trading
positions tend to perform well in periods of market-wide stress and when there are large
returns to following trends (which happens to be in volatile periods, when markets trend
more). Short-term demand-side investment managers’ FX trading positions, however, are
adversely exposed to systematic risk and market distress. These results are quite striking
as they indicate that long-term demand-side investment managers have very different FX
trading behavior and exposure to systematic risk than short-term demand-side investment
managers.19
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Table IV about here
Allowing for conditional exposures by adding interaction terms between market returns
(rm) and lagged changes in TED spreads and the VIX (Table IV, Panel B) leaves the main
factors chosen largely unchanged but tends to improve the model fit. The results reported
in Panel B thus corroborate previous results that trading from long-term and short-term
demand-side investment managers is very different and that their FX trading positions are
differently exposed to market stress.20
Table V about here
Since some of our risk factors in the above regressions are not returns (e.g., changes in
yield spread and the default spread), the intercepts cannot be interpreted as a risk-adjusted
return. We therefore re-run this analysis after replacing the non-return factors by their
factor-mimicking portfolios. The results, reported in Table IA.XXIII in the Internet Ap-
pendix, paint a very similar picture. We find that the intercepts for financial customers
are large and significant, ranging from 0.71% to 1.46% p.m. We also add two further
FX-specific variables to the menu of potential conditioning variables: changes in the aver-
age forward discount (AFD) across countries (Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014)),
which captures interest rate differentials, and changes in global FX volatility (Menkhoff et
al. (2012a)). The results, provided in Table IA.XXIV of the Internet Appendix, indicate
that incorporating FX volatility tends to drive out the VIX as a conditioning variable,
whereas the AFD does not appear in the top model specifications. Thus, from an eco-
nomic perspective, our main results are largely unchanged when considering these two FX
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conditioning variables.
We repeat the analysis above for nonfinancial customers’ BMS portfolios as well. The
results are shown in Table V. As might be expected, we find that risk exposures do not
matter as much for nonfinancial customers. Nonetheless, we do find evidence of a negative
equity market exposure for both groups (Panel A), which increases (decreases) following
increases in the TED spread for individuals (commercial corporations). Moreover, there
is some evidence that the individual investors’ BMS portfolio has positive exposure to
changes in credit spreads.
IV. Additional Tests and Robustness
We provide extensive robustness checks for all our main results. These tests are briefly
described below. More detailed results are reported in the Internet Appendix.
Transaction costs. An interesting question is whether the BMS returns remain large
after accounting for transaction costs. To examine this question, we compute net excess
returns for BMS portfolios by adjusting for bid-ask spreads.21 We investigate returns to
strategies with varying portfolio rebalancing frequencies to balance the effects of transaction
costs and using the most recent information. Figure IA.3 in the Internet Appendix presents
the results for rebalancing frequencies from one to 10 days. The dashed lines give average
excess returns (p.a.) and 95% confidence intervals for excess returns before transaction
costs to show the effect of different rebalancing periods. The solid line and shaded area
give average net excess returns (p.a.) and 95% confidence intervals when taking transaction
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costs into account. We find that average excess returns are significantly different from zero
for all rebalancing horizons and economically attractive even for short frequencies.
Panel regressions. We run panel regressions of currency returns on order flow to control
for other possible determinants of currency excess returns as well as cross-sectional and





j,t − it) + γ2rxj,t + γ3rxj,t−60;t−1 + εj,t+1, (6)
where j (1, ..., N) indexes currencies, rx denotes currency excess returns, OF c denotes the
order flow of customer group c, (i?j,t− it) denotes interest rate differentials (carry), and rxt
and rxt−60;t−1 denote lagged excess returns over the prior trading day and the average over
the past 60 trading days, respectively.22 The error term is given by εj,t+1 = et+1 +uj+j,t+1
and thus captures time and cross-sectional fixed effects (we also report results without fixed
effects below). Standard errors are clustered by currency pair. These panel regressions are
based on individual currency returns and not on portfolio returns.
The results reported in Table IA.VI corroborate our findings based on the portfolio
approach above. In particular, the results show that order flows of financials positively
predict future excess returns, whereas flows of nonfinancial end-users negatively forecast
returns. Importantly, the predictive relation between lagged order flow and future FX
excess returns remains very strong even when controlling for two common predictors of
returns in FX markets, namely, interest rate differentials (carry trade) and (short-term)
currency momentum (Menkhoff et al. (2012b)).
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Standardizing flows. We next check whether our results are robust to other sensible
choices of standardizing flows. First, in Tables IA.VII and IA.VIII in the Internet Ap-
pendix, we check whether standardizing flows over longer horizons of one and three years
produces similar results. They do. Second, we measure flows relative to total currency
trading volume (obtained from the BIS FX triennial surveys).23 The results reported in
Table IA.IX also indicate significant predictability of returns by order flows. Third, we
standardize flows by additionally demeaning flows over the rolling window (Table IA.X)
and we form portfolios that take positions in all available currencies with weights deter-
mined by the magnitude of order flow (Table IA.XI). Our results remain robust.
Longer horizons. We also check whether order flows forecast returns at longer hori-
zons. To this end, we first use an exponential moving average to sum order flows into
the past. We then use these lower frequency flows to build BMS portfolios that we re-
balance every 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 20, and 60 trading days. We report results for two different
decay parameters (0.25 and 0.75) in the exponential moving average in Table IA.XII. We
find that predictability dies out fairly quickly, although long-term demand-side investment
managers’ flows have some predictive power over longer horizons of up to one month (20
trading days).
Liquidity effects. To rule out the possibility that a simple liquidity story drives our
predictability results, we also look at the subsample of the four most liquid currency pairs
in our sample: EUR/USD, JPY/USD, GBP/USD, and CHF/USD. Table IA.XIII reports
results for BMS portfolio returns and Figure IA.2 shows results for BMS returns in event
time (similar to Figure 2 in the main text). We find that our main results remain qualita-
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tively unchanged.
Individual currencies. We next explore whether a specific currency is driving the
profitability of the order flow portfolios. To investigate this question, we rely on a cross-
validation setting in which we form portfolios as before but in each case delete one of the
available currencies. For example, we exclude the EUR/USD pair and compute BMS port-
folio returns for the remaining 14 (total order flows) or eight currency pairs (disaggregated
order flows). Table IA.XIV summarizes the results from this exercise. We continue to
find the same general return pattern, which suggest that our main findings do not depend
strongly on any particular currency.
In addition, we investigate trading strategies based on individual currencies where we
go long (short) on a currency whenever the order flow on the previous day is positive
(negative). As can be seen from the results reported in Table IA.XV, long-term demand-
side investment managers do relatively well on almost all currencies (except CAD, NOK),
whereas short-term demand-side investment managers tend to perform well only for the
Scandinavian currencies SEK, NOK, and, to a lesser extent, NZD. Commercial corpora-
tions’ performance is quite mixed, as expected, and individual investors show generally
negative performance.24
Order flow and macro fundamentals. Finally, we examine whether order flows are
related to future macro fundamentals as suggested, for example, by Evans and Lyons
(2008). We investigate this question in a cross-sectional setting, focusing on long-term
demand-side investment managers’ flows because we find in Figure 1 and Table IA.XII
that long-term demand-side investment managers are the only end-users with permanent
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forecasting ability. Figure IA.4 shows results for a simple exercise in which we forecast
real industrial production (IP) growth and CPI inflation differentials based on lagged long-
term demand-side investment managers’ order flows. More specifically, the figure shows
cumulative real IP growth and CPI inflation differentials for the group of countries in
the BMS portfolio over time, that is, countries in Portfolio 4 minus countries in Portfolio
1. We employ a frequency of one month to match the availability of CPI and IP data.
Hence, the figure illustrates the growth differentials between countries for which long-term
demand-side investment managers exhibit the most intensive buying or selling pressure one
period before. One can think of this as a cross-sectional out-of-sample test of predictability
analogous to the portfolio sorts in Table I. Here, however, we look at growth rates in
macroeconomic fundamentals and not currency returns.
Long-term demand-side investment managers’ flows do indeed have sensible forecasting
power for macroeconomic fundamentals, as shown in Figure IA.4. Their FX flows fore-
cast higher growth in industrial output (p-value: 0.09) and lower inflation (p-value: 0.01),
much in line with economic intuition. In other words, long-term demand-side investment
managers overweight the currencies of countries with improvements in macroeconomic fun-
damentals relative to the currencies of the countries they underweight. While this exercise
is intentionally simple, these findings are consistent with the notion of fundamental in-
formation processing by long-term demand-side investment managers, which helps explain
why their trades have a permanent impact on exchange rates.
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V. Conclusion
In this paper we empirically examine three related questions in an effort to improve our
understanding of the ecology of the world’s largest financial market, the FX market. First,
given that the FX market is fairly opaque and highly concentrated, how informative is
observing a large proportion of the market’s order flow? Second, do FX end-users share
risks among themselves, or is their trading highly correlated and unloaded onto the dealers
and the interdealer market? Third, how can we understand the trading behavior, trading
styles, and risk exposures of various key players in FX markets, and how is this linked to
risk sharing?
We find that observing customer order flows is highly informative. Currency excess
returns to portfolios mimicking aggregate customer order flows in real time are about 10%
p.a. and highly significant. In addition, customer types vary massively in terms of their
predictive ability, which matters especially because the FX market (like other OTC mar-
kets) is characterized by non-anonymity. Incorporating this feature into our setup, we find
excess returns as high as 15% p.a., that is, non-anonymity further increases the informa-
tional value of order flow. The flows by long-term demand-side investment managers have
the strongest predictive power for exchange rates, likely reflecting the ability to process
fundamental information. Their flows have permanent forecasting power, whereas flows
originating from the other groups only predict transitory changes in exchange rates.
We also find that the main segments of end-users differ markedly in their trading strate-
gies and hedging demands. Moreover, flows of different end-user segments tend to be
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negatively correlated over longer horizons. These findings suggest that risk sharing among
end-users takes place not only via the interdealer market, as suggested by previous FX
microstructure research, but also via the intermediation of large dealers.
These findings about information asymmetries, incentives, and risk sharing should be
useful to inform policy discussions on the appropriate framework for OTC markets. Taken
together, these results shed some light on one of the main OTC financial markets. Our
findings suggest that the FX market is populated by quite heterogeneous market partici-
pants, and that we can gain valuable insights from observing their transactions and learning
about their different predictive ability, trading motives, trading styles, and risk exposures.
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Notes
1Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) were the first to build cross-sections of currency portfolios.
2See, for example, Payne (2003), Love and Payne (2003), Evans and Lyons (2002, 2008), Evans (2010),
and Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2010). Other papers relate order flow in a structural way to volatility (Berger,
Chaboud, and Hjalmarsson (2009)) or directly to exchange rate fundamentals (Chinn and Moore (2011)).
3Several studies explore the underlying mechanism for the impact of order flow and discuss the evidence
in terms of information versus liquidity effects (e.g., Berger at al. (2008), Cerrato, Sarantis, and Saunders
(2011), Osler, Mende, and Menkhoff (2011), Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010), Phylaktis and Chen (2010),
Moore and Payne (2011), Ito, Lyons, and Melvin (1998)).
4This information processing can manifest in various ways, for example, as more accurate and/or faster
interpretation of macroeconomic news releases or better forecasting of market fundamentals such as the
liquidity and hedging demands of other market participants.
5There is also evidence that marketwide private information extracted from equity order flow is useful
for forecasting currency returns (Albuquerque, de Francisco, and Marques (2008)).
6Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), Farhi et al. (2013), Ang and Chen (2010), Burnside et al. (2011), Lustig,
Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011), Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015), and Menkhoff et al. (2012a, 2012b)
all build currency portfolios to study return predictability and/or currency risk exposure.
7In addition, the volatility of flows varies over time and flows tend to become increasingly volatile
towards the end of the sample. These features further call for some form of standardization.
8The nine currencies are: AUD, CAD, EUR, JPY, SEK, NZD, NOK, CHF, and GBP.
9It is important to note that we do not have data on individual customers and hence cannot use any
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information on customers’ identities; we only have data on customer types.
10This approximation is exact if covered interest rate parity (CIP) holds, which tends to be the case
at daily or even shorter horizons in normal times (Akram, Rime, and Sarno (2008)). There have been
violations of this no-arbitrage relation over the recent financial crisis. As we show below, the results in this
paper are driven entirely by changes in spot rates, whereas interest rate differentials play only a negligible
role. Thus, the results do not depend on whether CIP holds.
11In these robustness exercises, we also report results with longer rolling windows of up to three years as
well as for an expanding window. Furthermore, we conduct tests where we standardize both with respect
to volatility as well as the mean. Finally, we consider a standardization scheme based on gross FX turnover
data for different currencies drawing on data from the BIS FX triennial survey. These tests, reported in
a separate Internet Appendix to conserve space, show that our results are not sensitive to the way in
which flows are standardized. The Internet Appendix is available in the online version of the article on
the Journal of Finance website.
12Subsample tests for a pre-crisis subperiod from January 2001 to June 2007 and a crisis/post-crisis
subperiod from July 2007 to May 2011 are reported in the Internet Appendix.
13The MR statistic tests for a monotonically increasing return pattern, whereas the Up (Down) test is
somewhat less restrictive and simply tests for a generally increasing (decreasing) pattern without requiring
monotonicity in average portfolio returns. Specifically, the MR test requires that the return pattern be
monotonically increasing P1 < P2 < ... < P5 and formulates the null hypothesis as H0 : ∆ ≤ 0 and the
alternative hypothesis as Ha : mini=1,...,44i > 0, where ∆ is a vector of differences in adjacent average
portfolio excess returns (P2 − P1, P3 − P2, P4 − P3, P5 − P4) and 4i is element i of this vector. The
Up test formulates the null hypothesis of a flat pattern H0 : ∆ = 0 and the alternative hypothesis as
Ha :
∑4
n=1 |4i|1{4i > 0} > 0, and hence it is less restrictive and also takes into account the size and
magnitude of deviations from a flat return pattern. The Down test is constructed analogously.
14Table IA.IV in the Internet Appendix reports results for spot rate changes instead of excess returns,
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which display no qualitative differences.
15Table IA.V in the Internet Appendix also shows that excess returns to the BMS portfolios based on
different customers’ flows are not highly correlated. Hence, the information contained in the different
flows appears to stem from different sources. In practice, this also means that BMS portfolios could be
combined to obtain even higher Sharpe Ratios. For example, a combined portfolio long in the long-term
demand-side investment managers’ BMS portfolio and short in the individual investors’ BMS portfolio
yields an annualized Sharpe Ratio of 2.19, which is substantially higher than the individual Sharpe Ratios.
16One strand of literature argues that order flow is the conduit by which information about fundamentals
is impounded into prices and therefore has a permanent effect on exchange rates (e.g., Evans and Lyons
(2002), Brandt and Kavajecz (2004), Evans and Lyons (2008)). Another strand of the literature suggests
that order flow matters due to downward-sloping demand curves or “illiquidity,” and hence order flow has
only a transitory impact on prices (Froot and Ramadorai (2005)).
17This may be interpreted in the context of the adaptive markets hypothesis (see, for example, Neely,
Weller, and Ulrich (2009) for an analysis in FX markets).
18Using more than one lag of flows in the regressions generally yields insignificant coefficient estimates
so we restrict the regressions to include one lag of flows.
19Additional evidence is provided in the Internet Appendix. Table IA.XVIII summarizes exposures to
equity factors, Table IA.XIX considers FX factors, Table IA.XX focuses on the Fung and Hsieh (2002)
factors, and Table IA.XXI reports results for the BMS portfolio based on total flows for completeness.
20Table IA.XVII reports pricing errors for the cross-section of order flow portfolios. Specifically, we
report the Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) test for the null that the alphas are jointly equal to zero.
Corroborating the time-series regressions in Tables IV and V, the test always rejects the null of zero alphas.
21The bid-ask spread data are available for quoted spreads and not effective spreads. As it is known
that quoted spreads are much higher than effective spreads, we follow earlier work, for example, Goyal
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and Saretto (2009), and employ 50% of the quoted bid-ask spread as the actual spread. Even this number
seems conservative though. First, banks with access to this kind of customer order flow data are big dealers
and pay very low spreads since they are key market makers. Second, Gilmore and Hayashi (2011) find in a
recent study that transaction costs due to bid-ask spreads are likely to be much lower than our 50% rule.
22Using other windows of less or more than 60 trading days does not yield qualitatively different results.
23We linearly interpolate data in the BIS survey to obtain a daily time-series of trading volumes in USD
for the nine developed currencies and then use the ratio of customer flows to total trading volumes as our
sorting variable.
24We also report results for a portfolio of all individual trading strategies for each customer group (last
column in the table), which is more comparable to our order flow portfolios above. Qualitatively, the results
are very similar and we find positive returns for financial customers but negative returns for individual
clients. However, because the individual trading strategies are not dollar-neutral, the correlation between
these trading strategies’ returns with the returns of our dollar-neutral, cross-sectional BMS portfolios in
Table I above are quite low and often negative.
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Order Flow Portfolios: Excess Returns
This table reports average annualized portfolio excess returns for currency portfolios sorted
on lagged order flow. We standardize order flow over a rolling window of 60 trading days
prior to the order flow signal as outlined in the text. Column “Av” shows average excess
returns across all currencies. Column “BMS” (bought minus sold) reports average excess
returns for long-short portfolios in currencies with the highest versus lowest order flow.
Numbers in brackets are t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors whereas num-
bers in parentheses show (annualized) Sharpe Ratios. Columns “MR”, “Up”, and “Down”
report p-values for tests of return monotonicity. The frequency is daily and the sample
is from January 2001 to May 2011. Panel A reports results for total order flows and
all 15 markets (T15) as well as for total order flows and the subsample of nine devel-
oped markets (T9). Panel B reports results for order flows disaggregated by customer
type: long-term demand-side investment managers (LT), short-term demand-side invest-
ment managers (ST), commercial corporations (CO), and individual investors II).
Panel A. Total Order Flows
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Av. BMS MR Up Down
T15 0.82 1.05 6.15 6.77 11.13 5.18 10.31 0.00 0.00 –
[0.29] [0.37] [2.23] [2.40] [4.04] [2.20] [4.05]
(0.09) (0.11) (0.71) (0.77) (1.21) (0.69) (1.26)
T9 0.34 2.24 8.21 12.76 5.89 12.43 0.00 0.00 –
[0.10] [0.74] [2.60] [4.17] [2.15] [4.68]
(0.03) (0.23) (0.80) (1.23) (0.66) (1.45)
Panel B. Disaggregated Order Flows
LT* -1.13 3.75 6.30 14.31 15.43 0.00 0.00 –
[-0.35] [1.24] [2.04] [4.63] [5.72]
(-0.11) (0.38) (0.62) (1.38) (1.79)
ST* -0.32 6.05 6.26 9.78 10.09 0.04 0.00 –
[-0.10] [2.04] [1.94] [3.02] [3.94]
(-0.03) (0.61) (0.59) (0.94) (1.20)
CO 6.90 5.27 7.02 2.61 -4.29 0.35 – 0.09
[2.15] [1.73] [2.16] [0.84] [-1.66]
(0.67) (0.53) (0.66) (0.26) (-0.51)
II 12.71 6.69 2.90 -1.30 -14.01 0.00 – 0.00
[4.06] [2.18] [0.93] [-0.41] [-5.20]
(1.23) (0.67) (0.28) (-0.13) (-1.55)
*Long-term demand-side investment managers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and




Order Flow Portfolios: Marginal Forecast Performance for Longer Horizons
This table reports average excess returns (p.a.) for BMS portfolios sorted on lagged order
flow as in Table I. t-statistics based on Newey-West standard errors are reported in brackets.
We not only sort on order flow of the previous day but also allow for longer lags of up to
nine days between order flow signals and portfolio formation. Portfolios are rebalanced
daily. T15 denotes portfolio sorts on total order flows and the sample of all 15 currencies.
T9 denotes portfolio sorts on total order flows and the sample of nine developed currencies.
LT, ST, CO, and II denote portfolio sorts on long-term demand-side investment managers’,
short-term demand-side investment managers’, commercial corporations’, and individual
investors’ order flows, respectively.
Lags between order flow signal and portfolio formation (days)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
T15 10.31 24.63 10.22 -1.11 3.02 0.20 0.31 1.93 -2.32 -0.43
[4.05] [8.94] [4.38] [-0.44] [1.28] [0.09] [0.13] [0.84] [-0.95] [-0.19]
T9 12.43 24.27 7.44 -4.17 5.39 -1.55 2.28 1.33 -1.08 -1.75
[4.68] [8.73] [2.99] [-1.61] [2.00] [-0.61] [0.90] [0.51] [-0.42] [-0.71]
LT* 15.43 24.86 8.27 -1.29 2.17 0.62 -0.20 3.37 2.26 -2.79
[5.72] [8.80] [3.03] [-0.47] [0.87] [0.23] [-0.07] [1.22] [0.82] [-0.97]
ST* 10.09 28.22 2.05 -2.94 0.14 -6.19 2.84 -0.29 -4.66 -1.05
[3.94] [9.26] [0.79] [-1.15] [0.05] [-2.39] [1.12] [-0.10] [-1.77] [-0.40]
CO -4.29 -8.13 -1.47 2.25 -4.98 1.91 -0.01 1.40 -0.33 2.80
[-1.66] [-2.86] [-0.49] [0.88] [-1.93] [0.74] [0.00] [0.56] [-0.12] [1.08]
II -14.01 -33.77 3.21 1.82 -3.29 -0.77 2.27 -1.35 0.65 2.10
[-5.20] [-10.80] [1.24] [0.67] [-1.15] [-0.27] [0.86] [-0.52] [0.24] [0.78]
*Long-term demand-side investment managers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and




Drivers of Customer FX Order Flow: Panel Regressions
This table reports results for panel regressions of customer order flows (OF) on lagged
customer order flow (OFt for long-term demand-side investment managers, LT, short-term
demand-side investment managers, ST, commercial corporations, CO, and individual in-
vestors, II). The regressions also consider lagged returns on various asset classes as addi-
tional regressors (the interest rate differential i?j,t−it, lagged exchange rate changes over the
previous day ∆st and over the prior 20 trading days ∆st−1,t−20, and lagged country-level eq-
uity returns over the previous trading day reqt and over the prior 20 trading days r
eq
t−1;t−20),
and lagged country-level government bond returns rbt (10-year maturity benchmark bonds).
t-statistics based on clustered standard errors (by currency pair) are reported in brackets
and we account for currency pair and time fixed effects.








OFLTt 0.035 0.033 0.013 0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003
[4.46] [4.22] [1.79] [1.73] [-1.13] [-1.08] [-0.61] [-0.38]
OFSTt 0.034 0.031 0.008 0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.037 -0.350
[2.75] [2.66] [0.57] [0.50] [-1.70] [-1.55] [-2.59] [-2.56]
OFCOt -0.017 -0.016 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.034 -0.012 -0.013
[-2.58] [-2.53] [0.02] [0.05] [2.93] [2.88] [-1.47] [-1.62]
OF IIt -0.026 -0.025 -0.005 -0.004 0.025 0.024 0.027 0.025
[-2.10] [-2.05] [-0.67] [-0.61] [2.47] [2.46] [2.21] [2.02]
i?j,t − it -0.150 0.102 0.413 0.185
[-2.05] [0.80] [2.51] [1.02]
∆st 3.541 1.769 -1.312 -4.187
[4.97] [1.47] [-1.15] [-2.52]
∆st−1,t−20 1.012 0.612 -0.741 -2.187
[1.97] [0.50] [-0.45] [-1.52]
reqt 1.251 0.399 -1.164 -0.226
[2.56] [0.41] [-2.37] [-0.34]
reqt−1;t−20 0.347 -0.113 0.205 -0.225
[1.44] [-0.52] [1.17] [-0.34]
rbt -3.730 -5.170 -1.135 10.145
[-1.56] [-1.26] [-0.57] [2.68]
rbt−1;t−20 -0.019 0.278 0.626 1.151
[-0.03] [-0.55] [1.04] [2.03]
const. 0.008 -0.002 -0.078 -0.089 -0.320 -0.295 0.039 0.076
[0.71] [0.03] [-4.42] [-3.47] [-7.27] [-6.01] [4.77] [4.41]
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.029 0.030 0.015 0.018
obs 23,796 23,796 23,796 23,796 23,796 23,796 23,796 23,796
*Long-term demand-side investment managers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and




Risk Exposures of Investment Managers
This table reports regression results for the risk exposures of the BMS portfolios of financial FX market end-users, that is, long-
term demand-side investment managers (LT) and short-term demand-side investment managers (ST). The methodological
framework in Panel A is a modified linear Fung-Hsieh (2002, 2004) model with eight factors as outlined in the main text. Panel
B also accounts for conditional equity market exposures by including additional interaction terms. The three conditioning
variables are first differences of the TED spread, the VIX and the 3-month T-bill rate. t-statistics based on HAC standard
errors are reported (in brackets).
Panel A. Linear exposures
LT* ST*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
PTFSFX 2.35 -2.68
[2.65] [-2.51]
PTFSIR 3.07 2.18 -1.33 -1.16
[4.03] [2.86] [-1.85] [-1.67]
∆TS -2.03 0.38
[-2.06] [0.59]
∆DF 3.15 3.65 -3.58 -3.67
[2.83] [2.87] [-2.61] [-2.69]
V OLFX 0.07 0.06 -0.07 -0.05
[2.44] [2.13] [-2.50] [-2.09]
α̂ 1.46 1.40 1.26 1.23 0.71 0.78 0.89 0.90
[5.32] [5.45] [5.68] [5.25] [3.10] [3.49] [4.01] [3.97]
R¯2 0.10 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.10
Sys-BIC 3.53 3.53 3.54 3.54 3.53 3.53 3.54 3.54
Panel B. Interaction terms
LT* ST*
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
rm·∆V IX(t− 1) -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 0.15 0.17 0.16
[-2.95] [-2.69] [-2.47] [2.30] [3.08] [3.32]
rm·∆TED(t− 1) -0.18 -0.19 -0.20 -0.20 0.32 0.37 0.33 0.34





V OLFX 0.05 0.06 -0.05 -0.05
[2.08] [2.15] [-2.10] [-2.29]
α̂ 1.35 1.18 1.20 1.44 0.72 0.85 0.86 0.67
[5.57] [5.55] [5.38] [5.31] [3.50] [3.89] [4.05] [3.21]
R¯2 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.19
Sys-BIC 3.45 3.46 3.47 3.47 3.45 3.46 3.47 3.47
*Long-term demand-side investment managers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and pension funds,
whereas short-term demand-side investment managers comprise other funds and proprietary trading firms.
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Table V
Risk Exposures of Commercial Corporations and Individual Investors
This table reports regression results for the risk exposures of the BMS portfolios computed from
the flows of commercial corporations (CO) or individual investors (II). The methodological frame-
work in Panel A is a modified linear Fung-Hsieh (2002, 2004) model with eight factors as outlined
in the main text. Panel B also accounts for conditional equity market exposures by including
additional interaction terms. The three conditioning variables are first differences of the TED
spread, the VIX, and the three-month T-Bill rate. Below the regression coefficients, t-statistics
based on Newey and West standard errors are reported in brackets.
Panel A. Linear exposures
CO II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
rm -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10
[-2.32] [-1.63] [-1.94] [-1.56] [-2.27] [-2.43]
PTFSIR -1.83 -0.70
[-1.04] [-0.52]
∆DF -3.43 -2.20 2.57 3.18
[-1.38] [-0.99] [2.81] [3.51]
α̂ -0.30 -0.31 -0.37 -0.25 -1.16 -1.15 -1.19 -1.12
[-1.49] [-1.5] [-1.73] [-1.42] [-4.27] [-4.13] [-4.34] [-4.04]
R¯2 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03
Sys-BIC 3.93 3.94 3.94 3.96 3.93 3.94 3.94 3.96
Panel B. Interaction terms
CO II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
rm -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13
[-1.30] [-1.50] [-2.48] [-3.05]
rm ·∆TED(t− 1) 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.49 -0.20 -0.24 -0.31 -0.12





α̂ -0.46 -0.41 -0.37 -0.46 -1.18 -1.12 -1.06 -1.19
[-2.04] [-1.91] [-1.85] [-2.02] [-4.25] [-4.27] [-4.20] [-4.46]
R¯2 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.04
Sys-BIC 3.82 3.83 3.87 3.88 3.82 3.83 3.87 3.88
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Figure 1. Cumulative post-formation exchange rate changes. This figure shows av-
erage cumulative spot exchange rate changes for BMS portfolios based on total flows and disaggregated
flows over the first 30 days after portfolio formation. We use daily data so that post-formation periods
overlap. LT denotes long-term demand-side investment managers, ST denotes short-term demand-side in-
vestment managers, CO denotes corporations, and II denotes individual investors. Long-term demand-side
investment managers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and pension funds, whereas
short-term demand-side investment managers comprise other funds and proprietary trading firms. Shaded
areas correspond to a 95% confidence interval obtained from a moving-block bootstrap with 1,000 repeti-
tions.
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Figure 2. BMS excess returns in event time. This figure plots BMS portfolio excess
returns (solid lines) in event time, from five days prior to portfolio formation (t = −5), the
day of portfolio formation (t = 0), and up to 10 days after portfolio formation (t = 10).
BMS excess returns are annualized and in %. Long-term demand-side investment managers
comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual funds and pension funds, whereas short-
term demand-side investment managers comprise other funds and proprietary trading firms.
The frequency is daily and the sample is from January 2001 to May 2011.
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Figure 3. Correlation of customer order flows over longer horizons. This figure
plots average correlation coefficients between customer order flows (left panel) for horizons
of 1, 2, ..., and 60 trading days. Average correlations between flows are based on the
average correlation across all nine currency pairs. A horizon of one day corresponds to
(non-overlapping) daily observations, whereas correlations for longer horizons are based
on (overlapping) sums of daily observations. Shaded areas correspond to bootstrapped
95% confidence intervals based on a moving-block bootstrap with 1,000 repetitions. LT
denotes long-term demand-side investment managers, ST denotes short-term demand-side
investment managers, CO denotes corporations, and II denotes individual investors. Long-
term demand-side investment managers comprise “real money investors,” such as mutual
funds and pension funds, whereas short-term demand-side investment managers comprise
other funds and proprietary trading firms. The sample period is January 2001 to May
2011.
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